story that sounded unprofessional to one of the parties. Then it seemed he hadn't disclosed a (very remote) potential conflict. Any bias or partialitywas speculative, said the 1 1 th Circuit, refusing to vacate the award. Jarril F. Kaplan, Two years ago, the National Association of Securities Dealers launched an ambitious mission: to propose broad reforms that would improve the efficiency and reduce the costs of its own arbitration process.
The NASD appointed an eightmember task force for this purpose, including practitioners and academics with strong backgrounds in arbitration, business and public interest law. David S. Ruder, former Chairman of the SEC, and a professor at Northwestern University School of Law, headed the effort.
After numerous closed sessions, which included testimony by the p u b lic members of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration or SICA, the task force issued its report in January. More than 150 pages long, the socalled Ruder Report contains dozens of recommendations, some very significant, and some less so.
Overall, the Report brokers a delicate compromise between brokerage houses and investors. But parts of its 
In Delicate Compromise Between Brokers, Investors Task Force Proposes Reforms in Arbitration System
(continued from front page) proffered package don't serve the p u b lic interest.
The most controversial of the suggestions is to cap punitive damages at two times compensatory damages, up to a maximum of $750,000. Among the Report's many other recommendations is that parties choose arbitrators from lists the NASD supplies; under the current system, the NASD selects the panel. The Report also proposes to: establish mandatory lists of discoverable items; eliminate the so-called "six-year rule," which automatically bars consideration of a claim if more than six years have elapsed; and consider consolidating all arbitrations at the self-regulatory organizations, or SROs, into one forum under the oversight of the NASD.
What made such proposals necessary? By the time the NASD assembled its task force, large compensatory awards. By placing an arbitrary ceiling on awards, no matter how grievous the wrong, it condones unconscionable conduct.
The task force justifies its two-tiered cap, saying that it "will protect brokerdealers from 'runaway' awards that have no relationship to compensatory damages." Yet the task force fails to apply the same standard to its own proposed remedy. For example, what relationship does a $750,000 punitive damage award have to a $10 million compensatory award?
In addition, the Report suggests that claimants should not be entitled to punitives if RICO damages are awarded for the same claim. However, it does not recommend a $750,000 cap on damages in RICO claims. Indeed, the Report reasons that "RICO awards are capped by a treble damage provi-
An arbitrary ceiling on
complaints had surfaced that securities arbitration had lost its way and was becoming more punitive damages, no like litigation. One cause was the explosion in the number of matter how grievous the wrong, "condones securities arbitrations SROs needed to handle. As the stakes increased, securities arbitraunconscionable conduct.'' tions became less economical and speedy and more like the courthouse they were designed to avoid.
Both the NYSE and the NASD announced plans to address the troublesome issues facing SRO arbitrations. The M E , after holding a two day symposium, issued a report and reconimendations last year. The Ruder Report is the NASD's effort to calm the troubled waters. Here is my critique of its most important recommendations.
Cap on Damages
The Ruder Report proposes a twotiered ceiling on punitive damages: a cap of $750,000, or a limit of two-times compensatory damages, whichever is less. A rigid limit of $750,000 should be rejected out of hand since it is totally inadequate in situations involving sion, thus alleviating the concern of a 'runaway' award." How does this differ from punitives?
If the industry fears large punitive damage awards in arbitration (even when punitives reasonably relate to compensatory damages), then perhaps claims for punitive damages of more than $750,000-or all punitive damage claims-should be removed from arbitration and returned to the courts. There parties have the procedural safeguard of an appeal more readily available. On the other hand, if brokerage agreements force the public into arbitration with a $750,000 cap on punitives, then it's time to revisit the issue ofwhether these contracts of adhesion are enforceable.
Nor would I necessarily impose a cap / of two-times Compensatory damages. Courts don't usually have such a restriction; their chief limitation in awarding punitive damages is that the award shouldn't offend constitutional sensibilities. Still, several federal statutes, such as the Clayton Act, RICO and the Futures Trading Practices Act, limit overall treble damages (for both compensatory and punitive damages). Therefore, capping punitive damages at a reasonable multiple of compensatory damages might be palatable if it was part of an overall tradeoff: for example, in exchange for predispute arbitration agreements that didn't require the parties to waive punitives.
Arbitrator Selection
Under the current system, SROs select the arbitrators, giving each side one peremptory challenge, and an unlimited number of challenges for cause. The Ruder Report recommends adopting the American Arbitration Association system in which the forum supplies lists of arbitrators, from which the parties select a panel. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. Although the suggested change does not necessarily result in a betterqualified panel, it has the attraction of letting the parties pick their own panel. However, the system might not work in a geographic area where there aren't many qualified arbitrators. If the parties reject all the arbitrators on the list, it might be necessary to shift the arbitration to another locale, less convenient for the claimant.
Discoverable Items
Discovery controversies are beginning to sap the vitality of the SRO arbitrations. Often those controversies are unnecessary and represent posturing on the part of either, or both, parties. 
Six-Year Rule
Section 4 of SICA's Uniform Code of Arbitration (making claims ineligible for SRO arfrom actual, inferential, subtle, practical or any other kind of imaginable pressure. To the extent possible, it should be independent of the industry, independent of the plaintiffs bar, and, to some extent, independent of the SEC-except when the SEC is exercising its general oversight role. A bitration if six years has "If brokerage agreements elapsed from the event giving rise to the claim) was initiallv force the public into and the AAA)-should assess the suggestions of these two reports, and decide what to do next.
Will the NASD implement the Ruder Report suggestions, or will it first seek the advice and consent of SICA and the other SROs? Unfortunately, the Report suggests that the NASD might choose the lone-ranger approach. The present system of checks and balances, in place for 20 years, has worked relatively well. It has resulted a matter of administrative in steady and meaningful convenience ; the drafters arbitration with a $750,000 change from the Balkanized thought that in cases arising out of events more than six cap on punitives, then itys years old, the pre-hearing distime to revisit the issue of closure procedures ofarbitration were inadequate. The whether these Contracts of adhesion are enforceable."
AAA has no similar rule.
SICA never intended to foreclose litigation when a claim was too stale for arbitration. Unfortunately, some courts have donejust that. Other courts have ruled that the issue of eligibility should first be decided by the courts, not by the arbitrators.
In effect, the six-year eligibility rule has caused havoc with claimants by s u b jecting them to unnecessary delay, expense, and prejudice. The Ruder Report takes a giant step toward simplifying securities arbitration by recommending that this distorted rule be eliminated.
Single Forum
A more controversial proposal raises the possibility of establishing a single forum within an existing SRO. This proposal isn't new. Several years ago, some observers in the securities industry recommended that-in the interest of uniformity and economy-all the SROs leave public securities arbitration to the NASD. The Ruder Report echoes their suggestion, but ignores the general mistrust of the public and the courts in SRO arbitrations. SICA helped to overcome that mistrust.
Ideally, securities arbitration should be moved from the SROs to a totally separate and independent forum, as I recommended more than a decade ago. To have credibility with the p u b lic, such a forum must be independent single SRO forum under the NASD umbrella, no matter how well intentioned, could not possibly be totally independent,
In the past, the SEC has opposed the idea of a single forum, preferring the competitive choices offered by the various SROs. Perhaps a truly independent single forum is a Utopian dream; but until such a forum can be created, the SEC's theory of competitive forces is preferable-particularly in an atmosphere where arbitration is basically mandatory. Why should public customers be forced to arbitrate before an NASD forum when the disputes are with brokers who are members of other SROs, and involve transactions executed solely at the other SROs?
What Next?
Unlike the NYSE Report, which flowed from an open debate, the Ruder Report grew out of a broad spectrum of opinions presented in numerous closed sessions. The two reports give enlightened insight into the problems facing securities arbitration, and on many points reach similar conclusions. Now, an independent SICA-consisting of ten SROs, four public members, the Securities Industry Association and many invited guests (such as the SEC procedures of the past. It also has prevented some ill-conceived ideas from finding their way into securities arbitration.
Under the present system, SICA, an independent body, proposes rule changes. The SRO boards approve and file them with the SEC. The SEC then decides what the rule will be. By that time, all participants have had at least two bites at the apple: the public at the SICA level, and at the 19(b) filing; the various SROs at the SICA level, and at their board's level; the industry at the SICA level, at the SRO level (where it lobbies intensely), and again at the 19(b) filing; and, the SEC at the SICA level (where SEC representatives and others are invited guests), and as the final word at the 19(b) filing.
This pattern for rule changes in securities arbitration should be preserved. As an independent body, SICA establishes and maintains a level playing field. Its presence, like a cop on the beat these past 20 years, has been reassuring to regulators, the courts, and the investing public.
i

FURTHER READING
Like the NASD, the New York Stock Exchange has investigated the troiiblcsonie aspects facing SRO arbitrations.
Edited proceedings of the NYSE's two-day symposium on the subject appear in 63Fordhnvi Lazo It 1495-1 695 ( 1995) .
